to reinstate Glass-Steagall's wall of separation between commercial banks 7 and securities firms became major topics of debate among presidential candidates during the early stages of the nomination battles for the 2016 election. 8 It therefore seems appropriate to revisit the question of whether Congress had good reasons in 1933 to separate commercial banks from securities firms. This Article is part of a larger project in which I plan to examine the rise and fall of financial department stores in the 1920s and 1930s and to compare their experience with the central role that second-generation universal banks played during the booms and crashes of the 1990s and 2000s.
As I will describe in Part II of this Article, large universal banks became leading underwriters and distributors of securities in the United States during the 1920s. The preeminent universal banks of the 1920s were also the two largest U.S. commercial banks: National City Bank of New York (National City), the predecessor of today's Citigroup, and Chase National Bank (Chase), one of the predecessors of today's JPMorgan Chase & Co. National City and Chase established securities affiliates to evade legal restrictions on the securities activities that were permissible for national banks. Both banks and their affiliates created far-flung networks of offices to Congress to repeal Glass-Steagall). However, in 2012, Weill changed his mind. He called for universal banks to "be broken up so that the taxpayer will never be at risk, the depositors won't be at risk, the leverage of the [commercial] banks will be something reasonable," and independent securities firms could "make some mistakes" without causing a systemic financial crisis. Kevin Wack, Weill Puts Glass-Steagall Back on Washington's Agenda, AM. BANKER (July 25, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/177_143/sandy-weill-putsglass-steagall-back-on-washingtons-agenda-1051271-1.html (quoting Weill).
7. As used in this Article, the term "bank" refers to a commercial bank unless otherwise indicated. The term "securities firm" will generally be used to refer to an investment banking firm.
8.
See Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator for Mass., Senators Warren,
McCain, Cantwell and King Introduce 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act (July 7, 2015), http://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=872 (describing a newly introduced bill to adopt "a modern version" of Glass-Steagall in order to "separate traditional banks . . . from riskier financial institutions that offer services such as investment banking, insurance, swaps dealing, and hedge fund and private equity activities"); Gabriel Debenedetti, Sanders Thrusts Wall Street Reform to Center of Clinton Showdown, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/ story/2016/01/bernie-sanders-break-big-banks-217356 (last updated Jan. 5, 2016, 3:03 PM) (reporting that Democratic presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders "locked horns . . . when it c[ame] to reinstating the Glass-Steagall Act," because Clinton opposed the idea, while Sanders "renewed his call for a '21st Century Glass-Steagall Act'"); facilitate their underwriting and sales of securities in the United States and foreign countries. National City and Chase earned huge profits from their securities operations during the economic boom of the 1920s, but they suffered massive losses during the Great Depression. Both banks announced in March 1933 that they would shut down their securities affiliates. Both banks also received bailouts from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in December 1933.
As I will discuss in Part III.A, the Great Crash of 1929 and the waves of bank failures between 1930 and 1933 prompted Congress to hold a series of investigative hearings. Those hearings revealed that universal banks used unsound and deceptive practices to sell large volumes of high-risk securities during the 1920s. Universal banks also made ill-advised loans to investors and issuers to promote their underwriting and trading of securities. The sale of speculative securities by universal banks inflicted enormous losses on investors during the Great Depression. Congress responded in June 1933 by passing Glass-Steagall, which mandated a strict separation between the banking industry and the securities markets. 9 Part III.B provides illustrative examples of the abusive securities practices and conflicts of interest that occurred at National City, Chase, and their securities affiliates during the 1920s and early 1930s. National City and Chase used misleading prospectuses and highpressure sales techniques to promote the sale of hazardous foreign bonds and other high-risk securities to retail investors (including their depositors) and smaller financial institutions. Both banks made unsound loans to investors and issuers of securities to support the activities of their securities affiliates. Both banks organized trading pools to pump up the prices of their own stocks, as well as the stocks The abuses and conflicts of interest that occurred at National City and Chase illustrate the potential dangers of allowing commercial banks to affiliate with securities underwriters and dealers. The "Pecora hearings" revealed pervasive conflicts of interest that existed across the deposit-taking, lending, underwriting, and trading activities of National City and Chase. The disastrous experiences of National City and Chase during the early 1930s demonstrated the dangers of allowing banks to use their deposits and lending facilities to promote speculative underwriting and trading operations. The near collapse and bailouts of both banks also highlighted the systemic risks that are likely to occur when major banks and the securities markets become tightly linked. Finally, it does not appear to be a coincidence that the emergence of universal banks in the 1920s was associated with an enormous boom in the issuance of unsound and high-risk securities to the public. The misconduct that took place at National City and Chase demonstrated the need for strong laws to protect unsophisticated investors and other consumers against exploitation by powerful financial institutions.
II. NATIONAL CITY AND CHASE BECAME LEADING PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS DURING THE 1920S
During the decade leading up to the stock market crash of 1929, banks greatly expanded their presence in the securities business. As I have described in previous work, both bank loans on securities and bank investments in securities grew rapidly between the end of World War I and 1930. 12 This Part focuses on the dramatic expansion of securities-underwriting and -distribution activities that occurred at universal banks in general, and at National City and Chase in particular, during the Roaring Twenties.
The large-scale entry of banks into the securities-underwriting business in the 1920s marked the final stage in the emergence of universal banks (frequently called "financial department stores") in the United States. As described below, national banks organized securities affiliates in the early 1900s to circumvent legal restrictions on their authorized securities activities. Banks played a major role during World War I in selling war bonds issued by the Allies and the United States. The great success of the war bond sales and favorable economic conditions during the 1920s encouraged universal banks to expand their securities operations aggressively after the war ended. National City and Chase led that movement. "speculative use" of National City's funds to support NCC's clients, with resulting "peril" to National City. Additionally, he argued, the precedent established by NCC's affiliation with National City would allow "many enterprises and many banks [to be] brought and bound together," with the consequence that "the failure of one may involve all in a common disaster."
22
Lehman's warnings were prescient; they anticipated the debacle that occurred at National City and NCC during the Great Depression.
Secretary 35. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 224-27. 1919 that was designed to "finish the job" and "bring the boys home." 36 The "Liberty Bond" drives represented an "unprecedented" call on the savings of ordinary citizens.
37
To promote the sale of Liberty Bonds, the Treasury Department organized an elaborate "propaganda campaign,"
38 which "perfected all of the techniques now associated with modern advertising" and featured patriotic rallies, parades, and speeches by prominent celebrities and business leaders.
39
The government encouraged ordinary citizens to buy Liberty Bonds on installment plans or to buy "war savings stamps" that could be bundled together and converted into bonds.
40
More than twenty million Americans purchased Liberty Bonds and war savings stamps. 41 The experience of owning Liberty Bonds persuaded many Americans that "money could be made by the simple process of holding paper securities until they went up in value." 42 Commercial banks eagerly participated in the Liberty Bond drives and sold more than half of the $21. National City, Chase, and their securities affiliates were the unquestioned leaders among universal banks. Both banks built extensive networks of offices for selling securities in the United States and abroad. By the late 1920s, NCC maintained offices in more than fifty U.S. cities and several foreign cities.
53
NCC also posted sales representatives at thirty-seven of National City's domestic branches and many of National City's ninety-eight international branches, which were spread across twenty-three countries.
54
NCC linked its office network with more than 11,000 miles of private telegraph wire.
55
NCC sold about $20 billion of bonds and stocks to the public prior to 1933, and by 1927, it was "the largest agency in the world for the distribution of investment securities."
56 From 1921 to 1929, NCC originated or participated in the distribution of $10.73 billion of bonds, representing more than a fifth of all domestic and foreign bonds sold in the United States during that period. 57 National City and Chase were the largest banks in the United States in 1929 and 1930, respectively. 61 As described below, National City and Chase provided large amounts of loans, investments, and other support for the securities activities of NCC and CSC. 62 The managements of both organizations closely coordinated the operations of their banks and securities affiliates.
63 Under Mitchell's leadership, National City and NCC worked together to create "a global, allpurpose financial intermediary" that functioned as a financial department store. Peach, supra note 9, at 451, 510 (describing the desire of universal banks to offer "department store banking" that included commercial and investment banking services).
and trust service" to its clients so that they could obtain all of their financial services "under one roof." 65 National City, Chase, and other universal banks played key roles in promoting the sale of tremendous volumes of debt and equity securities during the 1920s. 66 Contemporary observers concluded, and modern scholars agree, that the securities boom of the 1920s could not have reached the same magnitude without the involvement of large universal banks.
67
Universal banks used their deposits to provide funding for margin loans that enabled investors to buy securities, as well as business loans that cemented their relationships with corporate issuers.
68 Universal banks also used their branches and affiliate offices to market securities to large customer bases, which included depositors, trust customers, middle-class professionals, and small correspondent banks. 69 In addition, universal banks gained the trust of National City and Chase reaped large profits from their securities activities during the 1920s, but they suffered crippling losses after the stock market crashed in October 1929. NCC generated total profits of $25 million during the boom years from 1925 to 1929. 71 In contrast, NCC suffered more than $100 million of losses from the end of 1929 through the end of 1932, and those losses erased more than 80% of NCC's capital. 72 After earning total profits of more than $85 million between 1925 and 1929, National City's banking operations recorded almost $170 million of losses from January 1930 through January 1934, which wiped out two-thirds of National City's shareholders' equity. 73 Many of National City's losses resulted from bad loans that the bank made to support NCC's securities activities. National City and Chase announced plans to shut down their securities affiliates in March 1933, even before Congress passed Glass-Steagall. In December 1933, National City and Chase each sold $50 million of preferred stock to the RFC, which Congress established for the purposes of providing assistance to troubled banks and other struggling enterprises. The RFC's capital stock infusions helped National City, Chase, and their affiliates absorb losses from depreciated investments and nonperforming loans.
78 National City and Chase followed highly conservative business policies to recover from their devastating losses during the Great Depression. Like many other banks, National City and Chase cut their dividends, reduced their loan portfolios, increased their cash reserves, and shifted their assets to safer, highly liquid investments such as government securities. [Vol. 90:1285 investments. 81 As a United States Senate committee report observed in 1934, "The annals of finance present no counterpart to this enormous decline in security prices." 82 In the committee's view, this implosion of securities values contributed significantly to [t] he wholesale closing of banks and other financial institutions; the loss of deposits and savings; the drastic curtailment of credit; the inability of debtors to meet their obligations; . . . the diminution of the purchasing power of the people to the point where industry and commerce were prostrated; and the increase in bankruptcy, poverty, and distress . . . .
83
Plummeting securities values and the accompanying Great Depression destroyed the public's faith in Wall Street. As Vincent Carosso observed, "Rarely had a group lost so much status and respect so rapidly as had investment bankers in the three years following the great stock market crash." 84 In 1932 and 1933, the "tarnished public image" of investment bankers "deteriorate[d] still further" as congressional investigators produced evidence of a wide range of securities abuses and conflicts of interest. 85 As the lead investigator and chief counsel for a series of Senate committee hearings, Ferdinand Pecora uncovered serious misconduct by both independent securities firms and securities affiliates of commercial banks. Pecora's role was so pivotal that the Senate hearings became known as the "Pecora hearings." 86 Prior to Pecora's appointment as chief counsel in early 1933, the "public's simmering and unfocused anger at Wall Street" had not yet produced strong momentum for comprehensive financial reform. 85. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 320-21. 86. PERINO, supra note 9, at 5 ("Pecora's stellar performance was so dominating, his questioning so riveting, and his investigations so thorough that the Pecora's investigations of National City and Chase-the two largest U.S. banks, which also controlled the two largest securities affiliates-had great significance for the future of the banking and securities industries. Pecora exposed a wide range of unsound financial practices, deceptive conduct, conflicts of interest, and insider self-dealing at National City and Chase. His findings discredited the leaders of both banks and turned public opinion against the financialdepartment-store concept of universal banking.
89
As shown below, National City and Chase encouraged unsophisticated investors to purchase risky securities through highpressure sales techniques and misleading prospectuses. Both banks used stock pools and other manipulative techniques to promote the sale and boost the price of their own stocks as well as stocks of favored clients. Both banks incurred large losses after making hazardous loans and investments to support the activities of their securities affiliates. Senior executives at both banks reaped extraordinary personal gains by exploiting their managerial positions.
National City and Chase Sold Risky Securities Based on Offering
Materials that Misled Investors National City and Chase sold huge volumes of securities to their depositors, small correspondent banks, and other unsophisticated investors.
90
As discussed above, National City and Chase built farflung branch networks to facilitate public distributions of securities that were issued by a wide range of domestic and foreign governments and business firms.
91
The mass advertising and direct marketing programs used by National City and Chase encouraged investors to 88. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 348-53, 368-71; PERINO, supra note 9, at 4-7, 208-11, 221-26, 280-90; SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 2, 29-30, 37-38, 72.
89. CAROSSO, supra note 9, at 328-35, 346-56, 370-72; PERINO, supra note 9, at 208-11, 221-26, 280-83, 292; Peach, supra note 9, at 551-80.
90. CLEVELAND & HUERTAS WITH STRAUBER ET AL., supra note 15, at 135-53; Peach, supra note 9, at 525-35, 542-46; Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 565-66, 573-76, 592-93.
91. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (describing the magnitude of National City's and Chase's activities in underwriting and selling securities).
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place their trust and confidence in the ability of both banks and their securities affiliates to select suitable investments for their customers.
92
As described below, that confidence proved to be tragically misplaced because many of the securities distributed by National City and Chase defaulted or plummeted in value during the early 1930s. NCC's marketing campaigns "assured prospective customers that if they saved, [NCC] would advise them how to invest." 93 One NCC advertisement warned investors that they "should not try to decide alone" and should instead rely on "the considered opinion of a worldwide investment organization . . . . National City judgment as to which bonds are best for you is based on both strict investigation of the security and analysis of your own requirements." In his March 1919 lecture to National City's and NCC's trainees, Mitchell explained that small investors could not be expected to make informed decisions about bond investments. He therefore declared that NCC owed a duty of trust and suitability in recommending securities to such investors:
We have gained the confidence of the investor and we are building our institution upon that confidence. We want the public to feel safe with us. We are going to make more exacting our yard-stick, because the small investor who buys from us today a thousand or a five hundred dollar bond is not in a position to know whether that security is good or not and must rely on us. . . . [W] e recognize that as between ourselves and this small investor, the law of caveat emptor cannot apply, and that if we are to fulfill our trust, we must supply that which means safety and a reasonable return to him. 96 Unfortunately, as shown below, National City and NCC used marketing and sales techniques that were far removed from the concepts of trust and suitability articulated by Mitchell. NCC's headquarters office sent to its regional offices a steady stream of "flashes," which contained sales recommendations and offers of cash prizes and other incentives for good performance by sales representatives.
97
National City and NCC also supplied hundreds of thousands of names of prospective customers (including National City depositors) to NCC's sales force. 98 Mitchell demanded a high level of production from NCC's sales force. He warned that NCC would not retain "any man in our sales crowd who would confess to his inability to sell at least some of any issue of either bonds or preferred stock that we think good enough to offer." 99 Many of the securities sold by National City and Chase proved to be disastrous investments for their customers.
100
Two studies determined that securities underwritten by National City and Chase had higher default rates than securities underwritten by other banks. The first study, by James Ang and Terry Richardson, examined default histories for issues of domestic and foreign corporate bonds and foreign government bonds that were advertised in the Wall Street Journal from 1926 to 1930. Ang and Richardson determined that the default rates for bonds underwritten by National City and Chase were higher compared with other commercial banks with securities affiliates; were much higher compared with the two leading private banks, J.P. Morgan & Co. and Kuhn, Loeb & Co.; and were about the same as investment banks (securities firms).
101
The second study, by Manju Puri, studied default records for domestic industrial bonds, preferred stock, and foreign government bonds that were issued in the United States from 1927 to 1929. Puri determined that seven-year cumulative default rates for securities underwritten by National City and Chase were higher compared with nonbank underwriters as well as other commercial banks that 97. PECORA, supra note 86, at 88-92; PERINO, supra note 9, at 198-200; SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 24. controlled securities affiliates.
102 Defaults occurred on more than half of the securities issues that were underwritten by National City and Chase and included in the data sets constructed by Ang, Richardson, and Puri. 103 As shown in the following summaries of transactions examined during the Pecora hearings, National City and Chase used materially misleading prospectuses to promote their sales of hazardous securities. In many cases, National City and Chase officials knew or should have known that their offering materials did not fairly disclose the very high investment risks inherent in those securities. (1994) . As I have discussed in a previous work, the general consensus among scholars is that the underwriting performance of commercial banks with securities affiliates during the 1920s was about the same as the underwriting performance of private banks and securities firms. See Wilmarth, supra note 9, at 605-06 (indicating the similarities between the performances of commercial bank affiliates and traditional investment banks). However, as I also pointed out, Congress did not base its decision to enact Glass-Steagall on any finding that bank securities affiliates had an inferior performance record as underwriters of securities. Instead, Congress determined that (1) "the involvement of commercial banks in securities underwriting . . . promoted excessive competition within the underwriting business and encouraged both commercial banks and investment banks to abandon prudential standards and promote speculative, unsound issues," (2) the hazards created by the involvement of commercial banks in securities activities could not be eliminated without requiring a complete separation between banks and securities firms, (3) securities firms should not be allowed to accept deposits in order to prevent those firms from using deposits to finance their underwriting and trading activities, and (4) it was feasible to adopt separate legislation (including the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) to prevent abusive underwriting and trading practices by securities firms. Id. at 604, 606-07; see also Peach, supra note 9, at 577-80, 605-15 (reaching the same conclusions).
103. See Ang & Richardson, supra note 101, at 364 tbl.3 (showing that twenty-nine bond issues defaulted of the fifty-six sovereign foreign bond issues underwritten by National City and Chase, for which the ultimate "fate" was known); Puri, supra note 102, at 403 tbl.1b
(showing that eighteen securities issues defaulted of the thirty-three securities issues underwritten by National City and Chase). Similarly, based on a data set of sovereign foreign bonds issued in New York between 1920 and 1929, another study found that twenty-seven of forty-five foreign bond issues underwritten by National City and Chase defaulted during the National City and NCC received a series of highly negative reports on economic and political conditions in Peru. A December 1921 report warned that Peru's finances were "positively distressing" and that "the government treasury is flat on its back and gasping for breath." 105 107 At about the same time, a vice president of NCC wrote an internal memorandum describing Peru's "bad-debt record" as well as its "adverse moral and political risk" and "bad internal debt situation." 108 In a July 1927 report sent to Mitchell, J.H. Durrell referred to Peru's "uncertain" political situation as well as "factors that will long retard the economic importance of Peru."
109 Durrell also stated that he had "no great faith in any material betterment of Peru's economic condition in the near future." 110 A March 1928 report advised that Peru's "whole taxation system is a hodge-podge." 111 An October 1928 report warned that "[e]conomic conditions in the country leave considerable to be desired" and that "local banks are still badly over extended," while the Peruvian government's "budget is not balanced and in fact the floating debt is larger than ever." 112 [Vol. 90:1285
Notwithstanding the foregoing reports, the offering prospectuses distributed by National City and the other underwriters did not contain any references to Peru's past defaults on its debts, its current economic problems, or the very weak condition of its government finances.
113
Peru defaulted on all three issues of bonds in 1931, and by 1933, the market values of those bonds had fallen by more than 90% since the dates of their issuance.
b. NCC's Sale of Minas Gereas Bonds
In March 1928 and September 1929, NCC underwrote two issues of bonds, totaling $16.5 million, which were issued by the Brazilian state of Minas Gereas.
115
NCC sold those bonds to the public after receiving highly adverse reports about the state's creditworthiness. A June 1927 report advised that "the laxness of the State authorities borders on the fantastic" and also warned about "the complete ignorance, carelessness and negligence of the former State officials in respect to external long-term borrowing."
116
In April 1928, after the first bond issue had been sold, NCC received another report, cautioning, " [T] here is a considerable degree of uneasiness on the part of all concerned over the question of the State's willingness to meet its obligations." 117 In spite of those reports, NCC's prospectuses for both issues of bonds stated, "Prudent and careful management of the State's finances has been characteristic of successive administrations in Minas Gereas."
118 That statement appeared in both prospectuses, even though an NCC official warned that it would expose NCC to "criticism" in view of "the extremely loose way in which the external debt of the State was managed." The prospectus for the second bond issue was also misleading because it did not disclose that almost half of the $8 million worth of proceeds would be used to pay off short-term loans that the underwriters had extended to Minas Gereas. NCC's underwriting group made those loans to Minas Gereas after the first bond issue failed to satisfy the state's funding needs.
120 As Pecora's questioning also revealed, NCC's underwriting group provided the loans in order to retain Minas Gereas's loyalty at a time when Kuhn, Loeb & Co. and other underwriters were trying to attract the state's future bond business.
121
The prospectus for the second bond issue stated that "[t]he proceeds of this loan will be utilized for purposes designed to increase the economic productivity of the State" and would comply with "law No. 1061 of August 16, 1929." 122 The prospectus did not disclose that nearly half of the bond proceeds would be used to repay the short-term loans made by NCC's underwriting group. 123 Nor did it disclose that NCC's Brazilian counsel had "drafted the law" (Law No. 1061) that allowed NCC's underwriting group to recoup their loans from the bond proceeds. Along with Chase and other large New York banks, National City made a disastrous foray into the Cuban sugar industry during World War I. The market price for Cuban sugar skyrocketed during the war and its immediate aftermath, due in large part to the disruption of beet sugar production in Europe. National City opened branches across Cuba and made extensive loans and investments in Cuba that equaled 80% of its capital in 1921. 126 The revival of European beet sugar production after the war led to a collapse of the price for Cuban sugar. Many Cuban sugar producers defaulted on their bank loans, and National City's Cuban branches were left with more than $60 million worth of nonperforming loans in 1921. 127 Mitchell organized General Sugar Corporation (General Sugar) in 1922 to take control of National City's foreclosed Cuban properties in order to bring those properties back into operation.
128
The Cuban sugar industry failed to recover after 1922, and National City still held more than $30 million worth of nonperforming Cuban loans on its books in 1927. National bank examiners repeatedly criticized those loans.
129
To solve this urgent problem, National City sold $50 million worth of newly issued stock to its shareholders in 1927. Half of those funds were contributed to National City's capital, and the other half were added to NCC's capital. 130 Before the bonds were issued, NCC sent Sterling Bunnell, an engineer, to study the Chilean sodium nitrate industry. Bunnell informed NCC that the Chilean nitrate industry was threatened by increasing competition from synthetic nitrate produced in Europe and the United States. In addition, the sale of Chilean nitrate to foreign markets was hindered by a high export duty imposed by the Chilean government. 137 Bunnell advised NCC that the "unknown factor is obsolescence" with respect to the future profitability of Chilean nitrate, and "it is impossible to prophesy the conditions which may exist in the Chilean nitrate industry within the 25-year term of [ In February 1930, CSC's underwriting group agreed to make a second public offering of $40 million of Cuban bonds, and the Chaseled banking group promised to provide $20 million of additional loans to Cuba. In return, Cuba agreed that the proceeds of the second bond offering could be used to pay off the $40 million of loans that Chase's banking group had previously extended to Cuba. 145 Thus, as a practical matter, the banks and underwriters used the 1930 bond offering to shift $40 million worth of sovereign credit risk from the banks to public investors. 146. Peach, supra note 9, at 574-75.
In order to attract and retain Cuba's business, CSC's underwriting group paid large amounts of fees to friends and business associates of Cuba's president, Gerardo Machado. In addition, Chase made substantial loans to President Machado and his business firms, as well as his friends, associates, and other key Cuban officials.
147
Chase's Havana branch employed José Obrégón, the son-in-law of President Machado, even though Chase officials believed that "from any business standpoint," Obrégón was "perfectly useless."
148
The prospectuses for the 1928 and 1930 Cuban bond offerings did not disclose to investors the special accommodations that Chase and CSC had provided to influential Cubans.
149
The prospectuses for the Cuban bonds indicated that Cuba's government had generated significant budget surpluses for several years when, in fact, the government ran a net deficit.
150
The prospectuses also misled investors by stating that Cuba would create a "special account" into which designated revenues would be deposited each year to ensure repayment of the bonds.
151
Cuba established an "accounting fund" for the designated revenues, but Chase learned in 1929 that Cuba was comingling the designated revenues with general funds and planned to use designated revenues to meet its general operating expenses. [Vol. 90:1285 during its most recent fiscal year.
153
The prospectus also did not include the $40 million of outstanding bank loans when it stated that Cuba's "total funded debt" was $87 million. 154 As a result, the prospectus created the misleading impression that the 1930 bond offering would reduce Cuba's "total funded debt" by $40 million. In fact, however, Cuba's debt remained the same: the $40 million of new bonded debt replaced the bank debt, which was repaid from the bond proceeds.
155
After receiving additional short-term advances from Chase's banking group, Cuba paid off the 1928 bonds. 158 The bond prospectus cited reports from three engineering firms, which estimated that revenues from the tunnel would easily cover the required debt service on the bonds during the first five years of the tunnel's existence.
159
The bond prospectus did not disclose that one of the engineering firms had a material conflict of interest. That firm received a stock bonus valued at $250,000, which likely would not have been paid if the firm had issued an unfavorable report on the tunnel's prospects. 160 The prospectus also stated that the underwriters "recommend[ed] these bonds for investment," even though the tunnel would face significant competition from two existing ferry companies as well as a new fivelane bridge that was scheduled to open a year before the tunnel was completed. 161 The revenues from DCTC's tunnel fell far short of projections, and DCTC incurred a net loss of $1.8 million during 1931.
162 DCTC defaulted on its debentures in November 1931 and on its first mortgage bonds in 1932. 163 By 1933, the bonds had lost more than 90% of their value and the debentures were worthless.
g. CSC's Sale of Lincoln Building Securities
In May 1928, a CSC-led underwriting group offered to the public $16 million of mortgage bonds and $5.5 million of debentures issued by the Lincoln Forty-Second Street Corporation (LFSC). LFSC was organized in 1928 to construct a new fifty-three-story office building on 42nd Street in New York City. 165 The prospectuses for both public offerings declared that the new Lincoln Building would be "one of the tallest and most imposing structures in the city" and "one of the finest office buildings in the country."
166
The prospectuses also assured investors that "demand for high grade office building space and for shops and stores in this very accessible location has been definitely established." 167 The prospectuses projected that future rental revenues would easily cover the annual debt service on both the bonds and debentures. [Vol. 90:1285
The prospectuses did not disclose that two members of Chase's board of directors had opposed CSC's involvement in the Lincoln building project or that a Chase officer had questioned the project's viability. 169 CSC's underwriting group had difficulty selling both the bonds and the debentures, and the underwriters were obliged to purchase more than $400,000 of the bonds and almost $3.8 million of the debentures.
170
Due to decreased demand for office space in New York City after the stock market crash, the Lincoln Building leased only about half of its offices. 171 In January 1931, CSC issued an updated prospectus for the first mortgage bonds, which represented that the Lincoln Building had rented 60% of its offices. CSC knew that representation was not true. 172 The 1931 prospectus also provided a higher valuation for the Lincoln Building than either of the estimated values contained in the 1928 prospectus, even though commercial real estate values had declined in New York City since 1928. 
National City and Chase Manipulated the Prices of Their Own
Stocks and Stocks of Favored Clients National City and Chase organized marketing campaigns and trading pools to pump up the market prices of their own stocks, as well as the stocks of favored corporate clients. Their manipulative techniques artificially inflated market prices for the targeted stocks, encouraged the public to invest in those stocks, and inflicted massive losses on investors when the stock prices later collapsed.
a. National City's Promotion of Its Own Stock National City delisted its stock from the NYSE in January 1928 and moved the stock to the over-the-counter market, where NCC could more easily control trading in the stock.
176
NCC then launched a massive campaign to promote the sale of National City's stock to the public.
177 By the end of 1930, NCC had sold almost two million shares of National City stock, for which investors paid about $650 million.
178
The number of National City's shareholders rose from less than 16,000 in 1927 to almost 80,000 in 1931.
179
National City wanted to attract more stockholders in order to create "more business opportunities" and more "prospective customers" for financial services offered by National City and for investments offered by NCC. National City established a stock-purchase program for its highranking officers in February 1927, not long before National City's stock price began its remarkable ascent. In December 1929, after the stock price had fallen from its peak by about two-thirds, National City established a stock-purchase program for its ordinary employees. Employees bought 60,000 shares of National City stock at prices ranging from $1,000 to $1,100 (adjusted for the 5-1 stock split), and many bought their stock under a four-year plan that deducted installment payments (with interest) from their paychecks.
184
As National City's stock price continued to decline after the stock market crash, National City provided shockingly disparate treatment to its senior officers and ordinary employees. The bank extended $2.4 million of no-interest loans in November 1929 to boost the "morale" of a hundred of its top executives who were struggling to hold onto their National City stock despite margin calls. Those executives repaid only 5% of their "morale" loans, and National City transferred the other 95% to NCC in December 1930, where the loans were either written off or not enforced.
185
In sharp contrast, National City rigorously enforced the installment stock-purchase contracts that its ordinary employees signed in December 1929, and many of those employees were still paying off their loans in 1933. At that point, the obligations of many employees under their installment contracts were far greater than the value of their National City shares.
186
One newspaper commented that National City's forgiveness of "morale" loans for its senior executives could not be squared with its harsh treatment of ordinary employees: "[T]he clerks of the bank, who had been urged, and in some cases really driven, to purchasing the bank stock . . . lest they lose the favor of their superior officers, were given . . . no aid whatsoever by the bank in carrying the shares they bought . Chase's program for boosting its stock price was at least as aggressive as National City's and produced similarly disastrous results for investors who bought Chase shares at the stock market's peak in 1929. Like National City, Chase delisted its stock from the NYSE in January 1928, and CSC thereafter purchased and sold Chase stock in the over-the-counter market. 188 Also, like National City, Chase arranged a 5-1 split of its stock in 1929 in order to reduce its market price and make possible a "wider distribution" of Chase stock to small investors. In August 1929, after the pools had completed their trading and Anaconda had acquired the two mining companies, NCC launched a massive public sales campaign for Anaconda stock. During the next two months, NCC sold over 1.3 million shares of Anaconda stock to the public at a price of about $120 per share. NCC pursued its Anaconda sales campaign despite NCC's knowledge that the market price of copper had recently fallen from twenty-four cents to eighteen cents per pound. By 1933, Anaconda's stock price had plunged to $7 per share, more than 90% below the price at which NCC marketed Anaconda's stock to the public. 194 In October 1928, CSC participated in purchasing and trading syndicates for the stock of Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation (Sinclair). Sinclair's chief executive, Harry Sinclair, and several other officers and directors of Sinclair also participated in the syndicates. The two syndicates bought and sold about 2.5 million shares of Sinclair stock and earned total profits of more than $12.2 million. Chase provided a $12 million short-term loan to assist the purchasing syndicate in buying Sinclair stock.
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The syndicates sold Sinclair stock to the public at a price of about $38 per share. However, by 1933, the stock price had fallen by more than two-thirds, to $12 per share. In Pecora's view, CSC's trading pools "were simply raiding expeditions on the market in the spirit of the times" and reflected CSC's willingness to exploit "the speculative frenzy . . . for its own profit." The Pecora hearings showed that National City and Chase closely coordinated the activities of their banks and securities affiliates so that each bank and affiliate operated together as a unified business. Mitchell acknowledged that National City was "inseparably interwoven" with NCC and that the two companies acted together as one "institutional entity." 199 Hugh Baker, NCC's President, admitted that National City helped NCC and that NCC helped National City "all the time." 200 Similarly, as Pecora observed with regard to Chase, "[T]he intimate connection, amounting to practical identity, between the Chase Bank proper and its security affiliate did not differ, except in details, from the National City model." 201 National City and Chase frequently made loans to support the securities-underwriting and -trading activities of their securities affiliates. From time to time, NCC borrowed up to the legal limit of $20 million from National City. 202 National City also made loans to brokers to facilitate NCC's purchases of National City stock. 203 In addition, National City extended loans to many of NCC's customers. In 1930 and 1931, National City carried on its books $80 million of "bridge" loans that the bank had made to customers of NCC in anticipation of securities offerings that NCC could not complete after the stock market crashed. 204 In June 1932, Chase held $130 million worth of loans and investments related to CSC's securities activities, while CSC held $34 [Vol. 90:1285 million worth of investments in its clients' securities. 205 As discussed above, a Chase-led banking group provided $60 million of loans to support the public sale of $60 million of Cuban bonds by CSC's underwriting group. In 1933, Cuba defaulted on $20 million of those bank loans, and Chase was left holding $9.7 million of delinquent Cuban loans. 206 The most disastrous foray by Chase and CSC was their joint effort to reorganize and refinance General Theatres Equipment, Inc. (GTE), and Fox Film Corporation (Fox). A detailed discussion of that debacle is beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to point out that Chase had made $77 million of loans by October 1933 to GTE and Fox and wrote off more than $55 million worth of those loans, while CSC wrote off virtually all of the $14 million CSC invested in GTE and Fox securities. Pecora's investigation revealed that the top executives of National City and Chase received extraordinary benefits and engaged in abusive insider transactions. National City's chairman, Mitchell, received salaries and bonuses totaling $3.5 million from 1927 through 1929. The disclosure of Mitchell's compensation in March 1933, at the Depression's lowest point, triggered widespread public outrage. 208 Mitchell received most of his compensation in the form of bonuses paid by National City and NCC. Under each company's bonus plan, the first 8% of annual net earnings were retained by the firm (i.e., the shareholders), and 20% of net earnings above the 8% level were paid into a "management fund." The management fund then distributed bonuses to qualifying senior executives. Mitchell typically received about 40% of the bonuses paid from National City's management fund and about 30% of the bonuses paid from NCC's management fund.
209 National City and NCC did not seek to recover the bonuses they had paid during the boom when they later suffered massive losses after the stock market crashed.
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National City's and NCC's bonus plans created perverse incentives that encouraged Mitchell and his senior colleagues to pursue ever-greater risks. As Pecora observed, the bonus plans made it "quite easy to understand the reckless, anything-for-a-profit mood in which the National City was operating. The officers had nothing to gain and everything to lose, individually, by a conservative policy."
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The executives knew they would receive only their salary (typically $25,000 per year), without any bonus, if their company earned net profits of less than 8% per year, because all of that amount would go to the shareholders. In contrast, they stood to collect one-fifth of any "superprofits" above 8%, and "there was no possible risk of loss of their own money to deter them." 212 In Pecora's view, National City and NCC gave their leaders "a gigantic, foolproof device for gambling freely with the stockholders' money, taking huge profits when the gambles won, and risking not one penny of their own money if they lost."
[Vol. 90:1285 insiders as well as Mitchell and a group of NCC's "officers, key men, directors and special friends." 215 After completing that sale, NCC publicly advertised that it had sold a large block of Boeing stock to "our own family and certain officers and employees of [Boeing] ," and NCC quickly arranged to list Boeing's stock on the NYSE. 216 NCC's advertisement was "well calculated to excite the greatest public attention," and Boeing's stock price rose sharply as soon as the stock began to trade on the NYSE on November 2, 1928.
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The immediate rise in Boeing's stock price produced potential profits of at least $1.6 million for the preferred list of insiders and friends of NCC and Boeing, including Mitchell. 218 In January 1929, NCC made a second sale of Boeing's stock, this time through a public offering. In connection with that offering, NCC sold a block of Boeing stock to the same preferred list of insiders and friends (including Mitchell) at a price that was significantly below the public offering price. Those on the preferred list once again received the opportunity to earn substantial immediate profits by selling their Boeing shares into the market. actively buying Chase stock during the same time period. 229 Wiggin even had the chutzpah to arrange for two of his family corporations to borrow the necessary funds from Chase so that they could make the necessary purchases of Chase stock to cover their short positions. 230 Pecora's exposure of Wiggin's short selling "thoroughly destroyed [Wiggin's] reputation." 231 Pecora also badly damaged Mitchell's public standing when he forced Mitchell to admit that he had created a fictitious investment loss to shield himself from income tax liability for 1929. Mitchell sold 18,300 shares of National City stock to his wife in late 1929 in order to create a tax loss of $2.8 million, and he bought back the same shares in early 1930. Mitchell relied on the claimed tax loss to avoid paying any income tax on the $1.1 million of compensation he received in 1929. 232 Mitchell's admission stunned the public and created a "portrait of a greedy banker willing to use any artifice to hang on to every cent of his enormous salary." 233 Mitchell was tried and acquitted of criminal tax evasion, but he was obliged to pay $1.1 million in back taxes and civil penalties. 234 In response to the public outrage triggered by Pecora's revelations, Mitchell resigned as head of National City and NCC, while Wiggin, who had retired as head of Chase and CSC in December 1932, renounced his lifetime pension. 235 The reputations of Chase and National City followed the same downward spiral as those of their fallen leaders. Mitchell's and Wiggin's successors, James Perkins and Winthrop Aldrich, announced in March 1933 that they would shut down the securities affiliates of National City and Chase, respectively. Those announcements provided further impetus for passage of GlassSteagall in June 1933. 236 IV. CONCLUSION Pecora's investigation of National City and Chase revealed fundamental flaws in the first-generation universal banking model of the 1920s. National City and Chase were the two largest U.S. banks and operated the two largest and most important securities affiliates. Their performances are therefore highly relevant in considering the question of whether first-generation universal banks posed unacceptable risks to the banking system and the securities market.
As shown above in Part III.B, the evidence produced during the Pecora hearings supported Glass-Steagall's premise that financial department stores created intolerable hazards that could not be resolved without dismantling the universal banking model. Those dangers included the likelihood that a universal bank would mobilize its deposits, lending resources, and retail branches to underwrite and market high-risk securities to unsophisticated investors who trusted in the bank's presumed soundness and investment expertise. 237 The universal banking structure also created pervasive conflicts of interest that tempted the bank to (1) make speculative loans and investments to support its securities affiliate, (2) provide risky loans to investors to support their purchases of securities promoted by the affiliate, and (3) extend unsound loans to issuers of securities underwritten by the affiliate. 238 Conversely, the universal banking model encouraged the securities affiliate to sell unsuitable, high-risk securities to the bank's depositors and trust customers and to pump up the market price of the bank's stock by actively trading in that stock. 239 As Ron Chernow pointed out in a 1990 book, the universal banking model allowed banks to "take bad loans, repackage them as bonds, and fob them off on investors, as National City had done with Latin American loans. They could even lend investors the money to buy the bonds." Universal banks also generated higher levels of systemic risk by increasing the likelihood that problems in the banking system would spill over into the securities markets and vice versa. Without GlassSteagall, as Chernow noted, universal banking would have "forced the Federal Reserve System to stand behind both depositors and speculators. If a securities affiliate failed, the [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] might need to rescue it to protect the parent bank. In other words, the government might have to protect speculators to save depositors." 242 To sever any links between deposit taking and the securities markets, Glass-Steagall barred banks from the securities business and also prohibited securities firms from accepting deposits. 243 The dangers of universal banking described by Chernow in 1990 were fully realized during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Large universal banks played leading roles in originating and securitizing hazardous loans and in marketing high-risk, asset-backed securities and related derivatives, which helped to produce the greatest worldwide boom and crash since the Great Depression. To prevent a systemic collapse of global financial markets, government officials in the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe rescued large, troubled universal banks and supported not just their banking units, but also their securities and other nonbanking subsidiaries. Governments also arranged and financed emergency deals that created new universal banks (e.g., Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley) and that enabled existing universal banks (e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank and Bank of America) to become even larger by acquiring troubled securities firms. As a result of those far-reaching government measures, we now have a too-big-to-fail policy that is widely believed to cover not just the banking system, but also large segments of the securities and insurance markets. As policy makers ponder the need for additional financial reforms, they should reconsider the lessons of the Great Depression, as well as the wisdom of the financial regulatory regime created by Glass-Steagall and other New Deal measures. For example, John Kay, a prominent British economist, has argued that the United States, United Kingdom, and other developed nations should establish regulatory regimes that create clear structural barriers (similar to those prescribed by Glass-Steagall) between traditional banking, securities underwriting and trading, and asset management. Otherwise, he contends, we will never overcome the pervasive conflicts of interest, excessive risk taking, and systemic crises that are inevitable byproducts of financial systems dominated by universal banks.
245
I intend to show in future work how we could accomplish a fundamental structural reform of our financial system along the lines advocated by Kay. 
